

Message Text

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NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSA-01 /062 W

----- 096251

P R 131845Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8761

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4658

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6316

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 13 SPC MEETING ON DETENTE: ITALIAN AND
CANADIAN QUESTIONS

MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH
ORIGINAL OF A LIST OF CONSIDERATIONS AND QUESTIONS ON DETENTE
SUBMITTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS BY ITALIAN SPC REP (SPINELLI).

ALSO TRANSMITTED ARE DETENTE QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CANADIAN
NATO DEL. PAPERS WERE SUBMITTED TO SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE
(SPC) NOVEMBER 13 IN CONTEXT OF COMMITTEE'S DISCUSSIONS
ON DETENTE (SEPTTEL).

BEGIN TEXT ITALIAN PAPER:

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S REMARKS, MADE TO THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CONTAINS AMONG OTHER THINGS,
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE THE BASIS FOR THE US APPROACH
ON DETENTE. AMONG THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL
WHICH COULD FURNISH AN OCCASION FOR AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE MINISTERS; I SHALL BE CONTENT TO
INDICATE THREE.

A. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS DEVELOPING BY MEANS OF A
BROAD "SPECTRUM" OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN ORDER TO JUDGE THE VALUE
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FO THIS PROCESS, THE RESULTS OF EACH NEGOTIATION SHOULD NOT
BE ISOLATED: ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER
THE PROCESS IN ITS TOTALITY.

B. IN ORDER TO INTEREST OUR EASTERN INTERLOCUTORS MORE

AND MORE IN THE DETENTE POLICY AND CONSEQUENTLY IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STABILITY, THEY SHOULD BE OFFERED THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING ADVANTAGES, WITHOUT OUR BEING TOO CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE MOTIVATED SOLELY BY A TACTICAL INTEREST IN DETENT.

C. THE NEED TO ATTAIN MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION MUST NOT WEAKEN OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN EFFICIENT NATIONAL DEFENSE.

THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS COULD SUGGEST THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN QUESTIONS:

A. IS THE PRINCIPLE ACCORDING TO WHICH THE RESULTS OF THE DETENTE POLICY SHOULD BE JUDGED ON A "GLOBAL" BASIS ALSO VALID FOR ALL THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES? WHAT ARE THE DANGERS OF SUCH AN APPROACH FOR THE EUROPEAN NATIONS?

IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE UNITED STATES ARE EFFECTIVELY CONDUCTING A "GLOBAL" POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THIS POLICY PERMITS THEM EVENTUALLY TO ACCEPT NEGATIVE RESULTS IN SOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SITUATION OF THE ALLIES COULD BE DIFFERENT: ONE WOULD BE TEMPTED TO FORMULATE THE HYPOTHESES THAT SOME NATIONS - WHOSE INTERNATIONAL POLICY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED "GLOBAL" IF ONE REFERS TO THE "SPECTRUM" OF NEGOTIATIONS - WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SEEK A BALANCE BETWEEN THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN EACH NEGOTIATION.

THIS IS AN ASPECT WHICH CAN BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY INTERNAL POLICY REQUIREMENTS AND IN RELATION TO POSSIBLE PRESSURES ON THE PART OF PUBLIC OPINION.

IT IS AN ASPECT WHICH SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED WHEN IT IS A MATTER OF DETERMINING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD ACCEPT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE.

B. UP TO WHAT POINT IS IT POSSIBLE - FOR THE EUROPEAN ALLIES - TO IGNORE THE MOTIVES BEHIND SOVIET DETENTE ATTITUDES -- IF THESE MOTIVES ARE SOLELY OF A TACTICAL ORDER - WHAT ARE THE DANGERS WHICH ALL THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO FACE IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD

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CHANGE THEIR POLICY?

THE US POSITION APPEARS TO STEM FROM THE IDEA THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN THE ADVANTAGES OF DETENTE AND BECAUSE OF THIS THEY WILL GIVE LESS AND LESS THOUGHT TO REVERTING TO A CONFRONTATION POLICY.

THIS HYPOTHESIS IS CERTAINLY ACCEPTABLE IN THE TERMS IN WHICH IT IS MADE, BUT A MORE DELICATELY EXPRESSED ALTERNATIVE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. THE SOVIETS - IF THE MOTIVES OF THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE ARE ONLY OF A TACTICAL ORDER-COULD, AT A DETERMINED POINT IN THE DETENTE PROCESS, JUDGE THAT THIS PROCESS HAD ACHIEVED CERTAIN EASTERN GOALS, THAT IS, WEAKENING OF THE WEST'S DEFENSE EFFORTS, RETICENCE OF OUR PUBLIC OPINION TO ACCEPT A POSSIBLY HARDER POLICY, ETC. AT THIS MOMENT, THE SOVIET UNION COULD CONSIDER THAT IT WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN, THROUGH POLITICAL OR MILITARY PRESSURE, ADVANTAGES IN THE CONTEXT OF

ITS NATIONAL NEEDS OR THE GOALS PURSUED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. IN SUBSTANCE, ONE MIGHT ADVANCE THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE SOVIETS, FOLLOWING A LONG PERIOD OF DETENTE, MIGHT BE TEMPTED NOT TO RETURN TO A CONFRONTATION OR "COLD WAR" POLICY BUT - PRECISELY BECAUSE DETENTE RISKS BEING FOR US AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS - TO FORCE US INTO AN "APPEASEMENT" POLICY.

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ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSA-01 /062 W

----- 096338

P R 131845Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8762

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4659

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6316

THE PROBLEM THEREFORE IS TO FIND OUT IF THERE ARE LIMITS TO DETENTE AND ABOVE ALL IF ONE IS TO ACCEPT THE THESIS FORMULATED BY THE (SOVIET/EE) EXPERTS, ACCORDING TO WHICH-IN THE LONG RUN- THE EAST BENEFITS MORE THAN WE DO BY THIS POLICY. ONE MIGHT, IN THIS RESPECT, CONSIDER THE ADVISABILITY THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE, IF WE DO NOT WANT IT TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO PROGRESS TOWARDS "APPEASEMENT", SHOULD BE PURSUED ONLY IN SO FAR AS WE CAN BE SURE THAT, IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIETS MORE PROFOUND MOTIVES WOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED BY THE PURELY TACTICAL REASONS DETERMINING THEIR ATTITUDE.

C. IF THE UNITED STATES CAN RECONCILE THE REQUIREMENT OF A DETENTE POLICY WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN AN EFFICIENT NATIONAL DEFENSE, HOW FAR CAN THIS PRINCIPLE BE RESPECTED BY ALL OF THE ALLIES?

DETENTE POLICY BRINGS CERTAIN DISADVANTAGES TO THE EASTERN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS TO OURSELVES. BUT IN THE WEST, BECAUSE OF THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION, THE DISADVANTAGES COULD HAVE A DECISIVE WEIGHT, FOR IT WILL ALWAYS BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO RESOLVE THE DIALECTIC ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE SUCCESS OF THIS POLICY AND THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO FACE A POTENTIAL THREAT.

ONE MIGHT WONDER IF WE SHOULD NOT INSIST, AT A CERTAIN POINT, THAT THE DETENTE POLICY SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE FORM NOT
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ONLY IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS BUT ALSO IN AGREEMENTS ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES (INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL FORCES).

PERHAPS IF IT IS TOO LATE NOW TO ESTABLISH A LINK BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR, SUCH A LINK COULD BE ENVISAGED IN A MORE GENERAL CONTEXT AS WE PROGRESS IN DETENTE.

END TEXT ITALIAN PAPER

BEGIN TEXT CANADIAN PAPER

(1) WHAT KIND OF FOLLOW-UP TO THE CSCE WOULD BEST CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE?

(B) IN THE ECONOMIC AREA SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE SCOPE OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE POLITICAL APPROACH ON EAST/WEST ISSUES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE HARMONIZATION OF THE ECONOMIC CODE OF CONDUCT WITH THE LEVEL OF DETENTE?

(C) FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW WHAT HAVE BEEN THE EFFECTS AND THE BENEFITS OF DETENTE TO DATE?

(D) HOW CAN THE WEST TAKE NECESSARY ACCOUNT OF THE OBVIOUS DIVERGENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS DETENTE? ARE THE CURRENT CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ADEQUATE?
END TEXT CANADIAN PAPER.
PEREZ.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO06316
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741185/abbryylx.tel
Line Count: 194
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10 APR 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <28-Oct-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NOVEMBER 13 SPC MEETING ON DETENTE: ITALIAN AND CANADIAN QUESTIONS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO
To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005